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Michael Santoli, Senior Markets commentator at CNBC on how he has used his experience covering 9/11 and has applied that to Covid-19. He also discusses the importance of Twitter in journalism.

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The Interview Discusses:

  • Michael’s fascinating career from being a columnist and feature writer at renowned financial publication Barron’s to becoming a Senior Markets Commentator on CNBC.
  • The importance of Twitter as a tool for journalists.
  • Michael’s famous source, ‘the mystery broker’.
  • How Michael has used his experience covering 9/11 and has applied that to Covid-19.
  • His thoughts on the possible rotation from growth to  value in the equity markets.

About Michael Santoli:

Michael Santoli joined CNBC in October 2015 as a Senior Markets Commentator, based at the network’s Global Headquarters in Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Previously, Santoli was a Senior Columnist at Yahoo Finance, where he wrote analysis and commentary on the stock market, corporate news and the economy. He also appeared on Yahoo Finance video programs, where he offered insights on the most important business stories of the day, and was a regular contributor to CNBC and other networks.

Santoli has covered the Wall Street beat for more than 20 years. Prior to joining Yahoo in 2012, he spent 15 years as a columnist and feature writer for Barron’s magazine. From 1993 to 1997, Santoli was a reporter at Dow Jones Newswires, covering the securities industry, and was awarded two Dow Jones Newswire Awards for distinguished real time journalism.

 

Click Here to Read the Interview Transcript

Transcript of the Interview With Michael Santoli:

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[00:00:11] Jonathan Boyar: Welcome to The World According to Boyar, where we bring top investors, bestselling authors, and business leaders to show you the smartest ways to uncover value in the stock market. I’m your host, Jonathan Boyar. Today’s very special guest Michael Santoli is well known to regular watchers of CNBC. Michael serves as a senior market’s commentator for the network.

Prior to that, he was a senior columnist at Yahoo Finance. Before joining Yahoo, he spent 15 years as a columnist and feature writer for Barron’s where I was a regular reader of his column, Streetwise. Michael, welcome to the show.

[00:00:47] Michael Santoli: Great to be with you, Jon. I appreciate it.

[00:00:51] Jonathan: Thanks for coming on. I’d love to hear a little bit about your career. You graduated from Wesleyan with a degree in history. How did you end up in a career in journalism?

[00:01:02] Michael: Well, the journalism part was, to the extent that I had a plan in school, it probably involved journalism, even though I didn’t study it. The financial journalism piece of it was somewhat more accidental. Wesleyan, of course, is just a purely liberal arts school, it was not really going to have something like a journalism degree, which was fine with me.

I felt like majoring in history was choosing a major without having to choose because everything is included in history and I was writing a lot and all that. I did work on the college paper pretty extensively. In fact, a couple of years, there was pretty much what I did at school, and at the paper at some point.

I did think that it would be maybe my first choice or something to do afterward, I didn’t do the greatest job in laying the groundwork for a career search necessarily before I got out of school. I had a few leads, but what I ended up hooking on was at a financial trade publisher. I actually got the job through a New York Times Help Wanted ad. There’s not many people who can say that or a lot younger than me at this point. This is the IDD, it was called Investment Dealers Digest, still exists in some form.

The business model was very high price weekly newsletters for very narrow financial subjects, only for professionals and they would hire young people just teach them in a hurry, the language and the ropes and the content to some degree and work them as hard as they could. Then they inevitably went off somewhere else within a couple of years.

I was covering the syndicated loan market, I was covering IPOs and really had no firm background in this stuff. It was really just learn the beat, learn the language, try to work the phones, it was a great experience in the sense of being on a steep learning curve. From there, though, I went to Dow Jones Newswires where I covered the securities industry, and that was a great training ground just to be able to write quickly and clearly, figuring out what the story is, learning a wide range of financial topics.

All this time, one of the reasons that financial journalism ended up being a place I stayed is because it was expanding, and it was becoming more mainstream throughout the ’90s. It seemed like it was interesting and the markets were getting interesting. I went to Barron’s from there, a pretty common route to go from Dow Jones Newswires to Barron’s owned by the same company.

Barron’s very market-oriented, but a lot more column centric, and a little more deliberative in terms of what you want to cover and where you feel like you have an edge and trying to be a little bit contrarian and trying to bring fresh info. That was the bulk of my career, I guess. All along the way, just to knit it up, I had done some video and TV.

Dow Jones had to deal with CNBC in the ’90s, and I was a contributor, and I was a point person to do television. That grew to be a bigger part of what I did through Yahoo and, of course, now at CNBC, where it’s pretty much the main gig.

[00:03:59] Jonathan: Barron’s has a great history of weeding out frauds. They were the first ones or one of the first people at least publicly to question Madoff’s returns. I don’t know if you were working or around that story, but it’s amazing that the regulators didn’t run with it then, it would have saved people tons of money.

[00:04:20] Michael: Well, it’s funny you say that because I thought you were going to say Charles Ponzi because Clarence Barron, one of his claims to fame was having partially exposed Charles Ponzi as well. No, I was not directly a participant in that Madoff story, a colleague of mine at the time, Erin Arvedlund was writing about it and interestingly had coming at it from the options trading side of things where it was just like this suspiciously regular returns, as you know, and it’s tough to put a real fine point on those stories because you don’t really have subpoena power. You don’t really know everything necessarily, but you can raise the question. No, I really love that about Barron’s and still certainly respect it. I would say it was great. For me leaving it was much more about exploring different parts of media and how media was developing from there, in terms of Yahoo, the opportunity to be over the top free Bloomberg with video and just to get an idea of how things were flowing in free internet, so to speak. Then, of course, CNBC I’ve been in the orbit of CNBC for over 20 years and it just made sense to settle in here at some point.

[00:05:28] Jonathan: You’re basically on CNBC throughout the day. How do you prepare for the show, when does your day start, and what are you reading? You have to be able to react to almost anything.

[00:05:43] Michael: It’s a constant process that isn’t so much a defined menu of stuff that I consume but I start on the early side. Even if I don’t have an on air booking in the morning, I’m usually up and moving and looking at the news. I’m a lifelong Newswire headline watcher in real-time and Twitter has absolutely replaced that at this point, for the most part.

If you curate it well enough, you pretty much get a sense of the stories of the day and what seems to be relevant for markets. I will do that scan, I definitely have access to a lot of sell side research, and the research boutiques and all that stuff, as you can imagine. I’ve had to chop it down into stuff I find very relevant in real time and try to figure out my touchpoints. I start scanning all that stuff.

On the early side, I’m usually preparing for an 8:15 editorial meeting we have here with at least some take on the markets in terms of what’s going to matter or what’s not going to matter, where we are in terms of field position in the markets, what some of the main bullet points that I think are relevant. From there, I could have a lot going on in the morning, I could have nothing.

I’ll review to a degree what guests we’re going to have and mostly, I’m watching the tape. I watch the tape in conjunction with a lot of color commentary that I’m reading about it, whether it’s on Twitter or just back and forth messaging with people. I always do write a midday memo, it’s just series of notes on the markets. I’ve done it internally here for a while mostly just to prep people for the show and prep the anchors and now we run that out on CNBC PRO subscription service in the afternoon.

To me, it’s jus like my desk notes but I just think as a snapshot of what’s happening in the market, I like to have that. Again, its like you’re right to figure out what’s important. Then I could just be called on to comment on almost anything. The thing about TV is I’ve, a little bit of an adjustment is that the main story is usually the story. What I mean by that is, it’s not like when I was at Barron’s where it was, “Oh, we’ll let the news get out there and people can talk about it and we’re going to find out the unexplored angle. We’re going to find out what it means.”

I have to fixate on the main event of what’s happening. My ultimate goal is to place it in context, whether its historical context, whether its in context of what a particular company’s done before, or whether it’s a response to a competition, or whether this particular type of market move is strictly technical, or whether it’s some major style, shift or theme that’s washing through the markets.

All that stuff gets thrown into the mix. I have to say, I wish I could feel as if it were more orderly than it is as a process, it’s much more just consume as much as possible, and try to eliminate what’s not relevant.

[00:08:44] Jonathan: It’s interesting, you mentioned Twitter, two or three times so far in the interview, it’s full disclosure, Boyar Asset Management own shares of Twitter, and we wrote about it and when it was about $29 a share earlier this year, the company has a market cap of $34 billion, which when you compare it to Facebook or some of these others is really quite small. Are you surprised based on utility of the service, that they’re not much bigger than they are?

[00:09:18] Michael: Yes, I think on a top-down basis, I’m surprised given its importance in the information ecosystem, the engagement of the people who actually are on there. I’m just less surprised given the fact that it suffers I think a little bit from the comparison to Facebook, where the monetization on Facebook seems just automatic.

There are quarters where Facebook, it seems like they’re trying to hold it back and try not to seem like that they’re this magical growth machine. $34 billion now to your point in today’s market, is not a big number for a company that has carved out that kind of place. I don’t know exactly what to do with that, in terms of I wouldn’t have a prescription for how Twitter should operate differently to try to change that.

There’s no doubt in terms of how crucial it is to people who do– I think the knock on it to some degree is, people in the news business and people obsessed with things like politics and sports are completely saturating Twitter. For other people, it’s easy enough to ignore, but that might be changing as well. It seems like it’s becoming much more central.

[00:10:33] Jonathan: To me, when we were doing our initial work, it just amazes me. At that time, it was in the $20 billion and it was roughly where it was in the 2012 IPO. We started seeing somewhat of a no-brainer. You had Jack Dorsey who runs it. He’s a brilliant guy, but he’s also running Square and he has other outside interests. I wasn’t doing it in terms of how to jack up the stock price.

To me, it was just amazing that a professional like you, and I’m sure you’re not the only one who relies on it for news, it’s just so comparatively small. It’s always amazement of that. I follow you, or my firm @BoyarValue follows you on Twitter. You talk about how you did it in Barron’s, about this mystery broker. It’s a really interesting story. I’m certainly not asking you, would you reveal your source? Do you mind telling everyone how that came to be?

[00:11:34] Michael: Oh, sure. It’s fascinating to me that it became the phenomenon to the degree that it has. It’s a weird lesson too, and I think there’s a behavioral aspect to it, which I’ll get to after, as to why people so flocked to it. It’s just this mystique of secrecy that I think amplifies people’s sense of somebody’s importance perhaps.

The way it all started was, it was really during the global financial crisis. I was writing my column at Barron’s, and this guy, and what I’ve said about him is just that he’s a guy, he is a broker, he’s a financial advisor, but of the old school. Got into the business in the ’80s. He seems to have discretionary accounts and things like that, so that there’s an element of where he’s actually doing his own research and trading to some degree, in addition to just acting as a financial advisor.

However, he emailed me with certain thoughts about my columns. His basic thrust, and this was very, very close to the 2009 law was. He had sent me– By the way, there’s something he wrote in 2007 before he was in touch with me, and I verify the date when he more or less called the top ’07 of the market. Anyway, he sends me this lengthy email with his thesis.

Every time I pushed back on it, he said, “Because the financial crisis is over.” This is April of ’09. Literally, nobody thought the financial crisis was over. What they thought was, “Oh, maybe we’ve seen the worst,” whatever the rationale. I was just impressed with just how he was able to boil things down to what seemed to be discounted already, whether we pass the inflection point, both technical and fundamental inputs that he used.

In a column, and I used to write short columns, a few 100, 600, 800 words, whatever it was, I just detailed this guy’s view in pretty significant detail. I introduced it in a way I was like, “There’s this guy who emails me.” Basically, trying to characterize exactly how I came upon him and people went nuts. The reception– I think part of, it was a very tightly wound moment in the markets.

If you were saying the bottom was in April of ‘09, a few weeks after it was, you’re really going out on a limb. Then later in that year, he basically says, “This is not a bear market rally. This will be a multi-year thing. We’re probably going to have pullback,” et cetera. He’s very tactical along the way, but it just gained this following

I never really intended to make him a regular feature of what I did, but people would ask all the time, and they would also criticize me for amplifying this guy’s views without giving his name. There was no real accountability and all the rest of it. It carried on from there, he just stayed in touch. I’ve literally never met him in person.

I know who he is, I’ve checked out the background and all that, and he’s never telling me anything that would be insider-ish. It’s just his observations and his analysis of what’s happening. What’s fascinating is, Twitter is like a little bit of an ideal way for this thing, this stuff to propagate and I would put stuff out there and I think even when I was at Yahoo, I created the hashtag because people would constantly ask me what he said before, it’s sort of all in one place and I just think it’s– First of all, he’s not always been right but he’s been more right than not typically, he comes from a particular discipline.

I think I would characterize him as being kind of in the Marty’s Zweig, very focused on some like monetary and fun flow and rate of change type stuff but it’s certainly pick individual stocks, and he’ll do work on individual stocks as well. It’s just amazing to me where it’s come to. Also, he’s been an influence on how I think about the markets to some degree.

I try to actually make sure that I’m not bending my thought, my view in a direction, because I either want him to be proven right or wrong, I try to disassociate my current thoughts with like, what he’s– For example, just recently, he basically saying like, the rotation into value, it’s got years to run, here’s why and he’s playing it. I don’t disagree with that but I wouldn’t be so bold as to actually assert that myself.

Again, the lesson in how people view and treat what seems like kind of secret backroom information from an unnamed source is really an interesting lesson because I truly believe if people knew his name and what he did day to day, he would just be another guy, and he would be another voice. Maybe he would be one that people respected a lot like David Tepper, where he doesn’t say much all the time but when he says something, people think that it carries weight or maybe he would just be like one of the many voices that we have on the air all the time, who because of their familiarity, people don’t put on a pedestal. It’s really kind of an unintended phenomenon and kind of an interesting one.

[00:16:53] Jonathan: He’s like your reoccurring deep throat essentially.

[00:16:57] Michael: Right, exactly.

[00:17:01] Jonathan: Years after his death, hopefully many years from now, you’ll reveal him as the way they did with Mark Felt.

[00:17:09] Michael: Wasn’t that a good example of that though? I feel like when Mark Felt was shown to be Deep Throat, people were like, okay. It wasn’t like some bombshell because he kind of knew what was going on but it wasn’t so scandalous that he was one of the top guys or whatever but no, that’s exactly right. In fact, I’ve asked him if he be interested in a reveal and he’s just not. I just think temperamentally, he just doesn’t really want the attention, but clearly, he loves to be right and he likes– he just interestingly, seems to like having that limited amount of publicity.

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[00:17:47] Jonathan: I hope you’ve been enjoying the latest interview with Michael Santoli. To be sure to never miss another World According to Boyar episode, please follow us on Twitter, @BoyarValue. Now, back to the show.

You were at Barron’s covering September 11th and I know you and I kind of talked about it a little bit off air. What did you take from your experience covering September 11th, from a financial journalism perspective that you currently applying to the COVID?

[00:18:20] Michael: Sure. I think one of the first things is a recognition of how markets will turn before it feels like it makes any sense to turn. The overshoot reaction on the downside and then before you really think the coast is clear, the markets will respond most likely, especially when there’s some kind of an overwhelming policy response as there was then.

Now clearly, it was a bear market before September 11th. It kind of gave way to a further bear market months later but the week after September 11th and when I was at Barron’s, we were in the World Financial Center across the street. I’ve had no crazy drama about the day, but of course, we were displaced, and the industry was completely hollowed out. It was obviously all the reasons we know pretty rough time.

We put out the paper that we’re going to publish remember the markets remained closed through that week. It was much more about trying to speculate on economic impact and what’s going to change and everything. Then the markets reopen the following week, I think the Dow opened up down seven, ends up being a pretty nasty little correction.

Going into the next weekend, the others thought, they wanted me to write a market piece and make a call on what happens next. I was completely nervous about it. I really didn’t know if we could be confident in the terms even under which we were trying to make this estimation and we ended up basically going with a cover story that said time to buy stocks now. That would have been, let’s see, 17, like September, the issue of September 24. We kind of got lucky timing-wise on it, and market went up 20% from there over the next few months before it did roll over again. That was a lesson to both of why you’re always going to be nervous when you’re deciding that the markets have already handicapped, or discounted awful events.

Also why you should never be surprised that how violently they react. The other thing that I think I’m carrying over here into COVID and did from the beginning is to be skeptical of that reflects strain of analysis that says, after this crisis, everything will change.

After this crisis, our behavior will fundamentally be different. Now, some of it, of course, will, but I just think back to 9/11, and nobody thought we were getting back on planes as fast as we did. Nobody thought that there would be international travel, and of course, we were worried about the war, and what would it do to the economy and everything else? I just feel as if I’m just reserving judgment, a lot of those things.

Right now, it’s all about like, are people really going to stay away from the office? Are people never going to be comfortable on planes again? Obviously, it’s unique in the sense that we have to find medical signposts for all this stuff when it might get back to normal. Those two things more than anything, I think, inform how I’m trying to go about covering things this phase.

[00:21:35] Jonathan: Yes, I am always skeptical when people say that the world is going to change. We had David Rubenstein on the last podcast, and he had similar views. To me, what’s amazing was, if you would just look at the headlines, starting in, I guess, early March, and you look, you had the chance to look at the headlines through today of what has occurred. You saw that over the past six months, the S&P is up 27%, up 14% year-to-date. The NASDAQ has advanced about 32%. Was there anyone emailing you or telling you that this is what is going to occur that this is actually like the mystery broker said in April of 2009, this is the time to buy stocks?

[00:22:27] Michael: I don’t think anybody said that it would happen that quickly. I think that it goes in these little increments. I think anytime that S&P is down almost 35% in five weeks. That’s usually a close your eyes and buy just for a bounce type of thing. I think it’s gone and it goes in these phases of, okay, fine, you can play for the bounce for mega oversold, maybe the most ever. We’ve already discounted a wipeout of earnings or something for earnings growth for this year, and then all the rest of it. No, I don’t think anybody really thought that it would round trip as quickly as it did.

Now, what’s been fascinating is the way it did it, of course, and I do think that all you would have had to say is that like, Oh, well, mega-cap growth stocks are going to be considered to be bond proxies and the safety trade and they’re going to expand their valuation up to 35 times forward. That gets you a long way toward the S&P getting back to the old highs but no, I think what’s been interesting this time around is that you had such disagreement going in as to how much of an economic event this was even going to be?

I’ll be perfectly candid that through February, I was in that camp that said, “Look, we’ve heard about these. We’ve had these pandemic scares before they’ve been localized. We’ve gotten lucky. If never, if you look back, you never felt like it was smart to sell on the Ebola scare, the SARS crisis, or anything like that.” I was definitely not one from an early stage that was saying, this is going to be big.

I didn’t feel equipped to make the call on the other end of it very well and not that I make calls even, but I do think that one of the main tasks I found myself, well, assigning myself here at CNBC, and it’s gone on everywhere, is trying not to pretend that every step of the way and every day, the market had it wrong.

It was very easy to say what the hell is wrong with the stock market, they don’t get what’s happening with 20% unemployment and shut down economies and mass business failure, you go down the list and I think it comes down to what the stock market does and does not capitalized in the given moment and what stock market we’re discussing. As I said, the NASDAQ 100 is perfectly positioned to be a net beneficiary of that type of environment and it showed through.

I mean, the other piece of it, though, is and this might be the most enduring impact of this period, in terms of economics and fiscal policy and things like that is basically short circuit in the recession with massive proactive response, $3 trillion from Congress, $7 trillion, whatever, another $3 trillion or $4 trillion from the Fed incrementally, whatever it’s been. It completely washed over the economy and did buffer things in a way that you wonder down the road if it’s going to just be considered to be like, “Well, why aren’t we doing this?”

Are you going to essentially just overwhelming force to try to prevent recessions because you haven’t yet gotten any of the bad side effects of that necessarily, so far. It’s been surprising to me but I think once we got into the summer, and the market felt as if it was just handicapping a process that it could monitor day-to-day, whether it be on vaccine development, or whether it be on re-openings.

There’s a sense that we got to created all these new metrics. They’ve been plugged into the machines, and the market was happy to just discount them day-to-day, with every incremental data point. At that point, it didn’t become, all that surprising to me. Also, the earnings floor was I think higher than most people thought would be, for a lot of companies. They just suspended guidance, raised a ton of debt, created a vast liquidity plan for the worst and then maybe the worst didn’t really last more than a couple of months.

[00:26:31] Jonathan: Something near and dear to my heart and you had mentioned that the mystery broker had said to you or I talked about you, do you think we’re really in the midst of a rotation from growth to value? How do you think it’s going to unfold? I’ve seen plenty of false starts for the last three or four years. I’m trying not to get too excited on any of these moves but it does feel like there might be something there.

[00:26:58] Michael: Yes, I’m on board with the idea. I think of it a little more as just a more inclusive market of broadening out. On a relative basis, stuff that’s more cyclical, tied to better nominal growth and just cheaper is it does seem as if there’s certainly a window for that to work better. Where I’ve struggled is the idea that with the major indexes at all-time highs, that somehow in a wholesale way, people are going to retreat from the best business models in the world with the highest profit margins, and reallocate in a major way into laggards and value.

In other words, my point is, I don’t think it’s a zero-sum game. It doesn’t seem as if growth stocks have to fall apart. They probably get derated a little bit. Just have earnings growth, that it’s not matched by stock price performance. I find a little more satisfaction in talking about cyclical as opposed to value because I think you’d get a little bit bound up in some of the weird statistical value measures that maybe don’t tell you much.

One of the issues is, obviously, in many sectors, if you’re buying cheap, you’re buying the disrupted. I just don’t know to what degree that’s fully been discounted. I think, to a large degree, it has been discounted, that that disruption cycle, these companies been living with it for a long time or they’ve been such, they’re now such small parts of the index that doesn’t really matter and the rest of valuable will take over.

I see the opening for it but it’s tough for me to think that it happens as a easy pass the baton at all-time highs from one style to the other, as opposed to in the mass of a correction or even a bear market. Although maybe the last several months collectively, was that hashing out process. I’m not really sure because you obviously remember in 2000, index did terribly, growth fell apart, and value didn’t have a bear market.

[00:29:02] Jonathan: [laughs] I love those days. Our view is this is not 2000 that those leaders are actually really solid good businesses. I just think the rest will play catch up but does an Apple deserve to trade at 30 some odd times earnings should be treated more like a consumer staple, that type of thing might happen. Amazon’s in its own orbit, how that plays out with regulations. It will be interesting to see. That’s what makes it really interesting.

One of the things I see you utilize, we don’t use it just because it’s just not part of our style. I’m not saying that there’s not a reason for and I think a lot of people do it very well is technical analysis. How do you think investors should be thinking about technicals when making their buy and sell decision? What should they really be paying attention to?

[00:30:02] Michael: It’s interesting because, first of all, I am a complete amateur practitioner. I don’t really consider myself a technician either by belief or practice, but I do highlight a lot of technical metrics. I do view the world to some degree through those frames. The reason I do it, to be honest with you is, I’m always looking for context. I’m always looking to place what’s happening today in terms of what came before. I want to get a sense of trend, I want to know if this is just a continuation of what’s been going on or if it’s been some kind of an aberration, and whatever.

I don’t really focus as much on levels and absolute price signals and targets as much as saying, you have to have a really good reason to fight an entrenched trend. If the price hasn’t got diverge massively and decided to get very overbought or oversold, the trend is something you should probably– It’s like path of least resistance.

I follow people who make very persuasive arguments that like, “If you see a stock that falls out of bed, it gets oversold, but it’s in an uptrend, there’s your opportunity.” Those are the types of dips that you want to buy and vice versa. If some oil and gas stock is in this disgusting looking downtrend, and it just pops 20%, don’t think that’s a trend reversal, you need some more confirmation.

To me, it’s about listening to the market, as much as telling the market what it ought to be doing. I’m not one of those people who says the only truth is price and fundamental analysis is useless. For me, it’s more of a convenience to how I should portray what’s happening in the market, graphically and narratively, than it is believing that technicals are magic in terms of trading or investing.

I’d make that distinction to some degree, but I’m a huge baseball fan. It’s like, I believe all this high powered statistical stuff that people have come up with, it’s an amazing way to decide what matters in a game and what types of players might be more or less valuable, but it doesn’t really entirely replace having a sense of who performs well in better situations and trying to project out how a team might perform or something like that.

I also like to see the game unfold, let’s be honest. What I’m mostly doing is color commentary on the action. Not predicting the next move, we’re just trying to give some perspective on how it’s been going. I think the technicals at least helped me do that.

[00:32:52] Jonathan: Michael, you’ve been more than generous with your time and you’ve gone 15 minutes over than what I told you it would be and I know you probably have some stories you need to cover. I want to thank you for appearing on The World According to Boyar and I really appreciate your time and insights. To be sure to never miss another World According to Boyar, please follow us on Twitter @BoyarValue. Michael, again, thanks for being on the show.

[00:33:19] Michael: It was great. It was great to talk to you.

[music]

[00:33:40] [END OF AUDIO]

 

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Sir Martin E. Franklin, Founder & CEO of Mariposa Capital/ Founder of Jarden Corporation, on SPACs, Capital Allocation, Acquisition Strategy and Business Success.

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The interview discusses:

  • The differences between the current business climate and the one at the start of his career in the 1980s.
  • His views on when share buybacks are appropriate.
  • Why capital allocation was so critical for shareholder returns at Jarden.
  • Executives he believes are good capital allocators.
  • How he managed to gain control of the company that eventually turned into Jarden.
  • The acquisition strategy he employed while running Jarden (that he still employs today).
  • How he evaluated brand equity when making acquisitions of consumer products companies.
  • Why he believes he would have had the same success today even with the growing popularity of private label brands from Amazon and Costco.
  • His current views on Newell.
  • His latest SPAC (which he is partnering with Viking Global on) and what his acquisition strategy will be.
  • And much more…

About Sir Martin E. Franklin:

Sir Martin E. Franklin is the Founder and CEO of Mariposa Capital, a Miami based family investment firm focused on long term value creation across various industries. Mr. Franklin serves as Founder and Executive Chairman of Element Solutions Inc., Co-Founder and Co-Chairman of Nomad Foods Limited, Co-Founder and Co-Chairman of APi Group Corporation and Chairman and controlling shareholder of Royal Oak Enterprises, LLC. He is a principal and executive officer of several other private investment entities.

Prior to founding Mariposa Capital, Mr. Franklin founded Jarden Corporation in 2001. Under his leadership, Jarden grew from approximately $300 million in revenues to more than $10 billion, comprised of over 120 global brands and 35,000 employees before it was acquired by Newell Brands in April 2016. He served as Executive Chairman of Bollé, Inc. from 1997 to 2000 and Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Benson Eyecare Corporation from 1992 to its sale in 1996. Jarden and Benson generated over 5,000% and 1,800% stock returns to their investors respectively.

Mr. Franklin received a BA from the University of Pennsylvania. A father of four, he resides in Miami, FL with his wife Julie. He is an avid endurance sports enthusiast and an active supporter of a number of charities including the Challenged Athletes Foundation and Wounded Warriors Project.

 

Click Here to Read the Interview Transcript

Transcript Of The Interview With Sir Martin E. Franklin:

[00:00:11] Jonathan Boyar: Welcome to The World According to Boyar, where we bring top investors, best-selling authors, and business leaders to show you the smartest ways to uncover value in the stock market. I’m your host, Jonathan Boyar. Today’s very special guest is Sir Martin Franklin, whose business career dates back to the 1980s, where at the age of 24, Martin and his father took control of DRG, where he became CEO of a company with over 13,000 employees and was tasked with the job of breaking up the conglomerate.

In the early ’90s, he pivoted to an investment style where he wanted to build companies and purchased a small chain of eyecare stores that was merged into a company called Benson, where he completed the successful roll-up of the optical industry, earning his initial investors more than a 23 fold return on their investment when he sold the company in 1996. Martin is probably best known for his success at Jarden Corp, where through a series of successful M&A transactions, he built an empire he sold to Newell in 2016. For the 15 years, Martin was Chairman of Jarden, his investors earned a compounded annual return of well over 30%. Martin, welcome to the show.

[00:01:22] Martin Franklin: Thank you for having me, Jonathan.

[00:01:24] Jonathan: Before we discuss your truly remarkable career, I just wanted to briefly talk about your love of extreme sports. You completed the Badwater Ultramarathon in 41 hours and 29 minutes, five hours ahead of your goal time. The race I believe, covers 135 miles starting in Death Valley in July. I mean this in the most respectful way possible. What were you thinking?

[00:01:48] Martin: To get to the stage of wanting to do Badwater was a progression, a journey of going on to do more and more extreme things and then I met an individual fellow Vito Bialla who owned a brand called Zoot Sports, which I ended up partnering with him on, who said, “I could take you to a place where very few people have ever been in terms of taking athletics to the extreme.” I was intrigued.

Then he explained to me what this race was, and I said, “You’ve got to be crazy. No one does that.” He said, “No, no, there are 90 people a year who do it or at least who try to do it.” I just decided that’s what I wanted to do. It was instinctive and I just liked the idea that you could do something that was almost a spiritual journey. It’s beyond athletic because it’s all about mental discipline and that really appealed to me. That’s why I decided to take it on.

[00:02:42] Jonathan: Do you think any of the qualities especially the mental discipline that makes someone able to do these super endurance challenges translates to business success?

[00:02:51] Martin: Yes, I do. I think mental discipline is fundamental in business, and I think that the journey– I could tell you from, personal experience, this journey, it was a spiritual as it was athletic. Given one time to think and learning that you really can push to another level. I think that’s some relevance there to one’s business life. I do think it’s quirky, I will be the first to admit that I always think that a lot of the ultra-people that I know are slightly strange. I don’t think of myself as slightly strange. Then again, who knows, probably other people perceive me a different way.

[00:03:35] Jonathan: I read an article and I think it’s great. Your son, Robbie, followed you into the love of extreme sports and the two of you completed the St. Croix Half Ironman Triathlon together. Robbie was 16 at the time. As a father, what was that like?

[00:03:51] Martin: I think of all the races I’ve done that the two most enjoyable races I had were the two Half Ironman’s I did with two of my, I have three sons and a daughter but two of my sons did these races each at 16. Robbie did St. Croix and my son Mikey did one in Show Low called the Show Low Arizona Half Ironman. Yes, those were the two most enjoyable races I could have had.

They are good athletes, great athletes. They didn’t choose to pursue what I pursued. The truth is I picked up doing extreme sports in my 30s. I played soccer till I was about 32. They may yet decide to do that. That was something that grabbed me later on in life. It’s really not for the young, they prefer to play, go skiing, play tennis and play basketball.

[00:04:39] Jonathan: Let’s shift gears to your career and interestingly, you started at Rothschild where you were the youngest Vice President in the firm’s history. Then you started working for your father, who was the former partner of James Goldsmith. What was it like working with your dad?

[00:04:56] Martin: I loved working with my dad. I was probably one of those few sons that regretted my father retiring. I was the youngest of six. For me, it was a bit of a catch-up opportunity to spend a lot of time with my father. I got to see another side of him as I partnered with him and it was a great experience, one I’ll never forget.

My father was 94. I’m very thankful for those years that I had to be under him. He taught me a lot, particularly how to treat people and what priorities were and never to take oneself too seriously or never to believe that just because he had some success that you were any better than anybody else. Those were things I learned from him.

[00:05:36] Jonathan: He had an interesting style, and I think it was a style of the time of breaking up companies, and it worked quite well in the ’80s. It seemed like a perfect time to execute such a strategy, especially after all the excessive conglomerate building in the ’60s that made corporations bloated and inefficient. Do you think if he was working in the ’90s or today, he would have done things differently?

[00:05:59] Martin: I think the reality is my father was a banker. That was his real background. He got to know Jimmy Goldsmith because he was his banker at the time. I think that what they did was, as you said, important for the time and I think these things do go in cycles and based on economic need. Because of the inefficiencies that were created by the conglomerations that were made in the 1950s and ’60s and early ’70s, having some catalysts like my father and Jimmy was essential for industry.

They served an important role, but it became irrelevant at some point because the efficiencies have been found and the market had adjusted. That was really when they retired. I think that today, people are doing similar catalytic things, but they’re doing them in a very different way, but much more appropriate for the times today. You always have to have some engine there in order to drive towards efficiency and making sure that inefficiencies don’t exist for very long in any place in the capitalist system.

[00:07:09] Jonathan: What are some of the catalytic trends that you think are worth exploring today?

[00:07:15] Martin: Well, I think that you have to look at the things that have been happening. First of all, you go back to the activists so that you like the takeover artists and think conglomerators of yesteryear are the activist investors of today. They’re trying to push companies to find initiatives within themselves, rather than making takeover attempts and ask them to bust them up. Some of that’s because of the laws have changed. Some of it is because it’s really a better way to go because, in a way, you’re bringing all those benefits to all shareholders as opposed to just the buyer.

I think the second if you like, trend today and I’ve been a part of that is towards bringing companies back to the public markets. You see all of these SPACs. They are, if you like, the LBOs of today’s environment. They’ve become quite a trend. People go into market using equity for doing transactions, but in some other scenarios might have been private equity deals. That’s just, I guess, a couple of examples of things that are going on, but I think it keeps on shifting over time. I’m sure that in 10 years’ time, there’ll be something else.

[00:08:23] Jonathan: One of the things in the activist playbook is, lever up the balance sheet buy back a lot of shares. It’s great for a short-term potential pop in the stock. Its appropriate today’s the day that Sumner Redstone passed away. Viacom is a perfect example of, yes, you could spend a ton of money buying back stock or CBS Viacom, but if you don’t invest in content, or whatever you’re building, you’re not going to have a good long-term results. Do you have any views on share buybacks?

[00:08:55] Martin: Yes, I’m a believer in share buybacks when it’s appropriate. I think the mistake that a lot of companies have made is they’re not very good at them. You take a company like Teledyne over the years, maybe in the book Outliers, you’ll see a number of examples. The great thing about being a public company is if you’re a good capital allocator, you know when it’s a good time to issue shares, you know when it’s a good time to buy them back.

When you go back and look at Jarden’s history, we bought companies and there were periods of time when we bought shares back, and we had periods of time when we issued shares. The reason we had a 34% compound return for investors over 15 years was because, with the benefit of hindsight, of course, we timed those things correctly. I think just when activists come in and their only playbook is, I think you should lever up buy and bunch of shares back no matter what the price, I completely agree that that’s not a good thing to do and particularly if it sacrifices necessary investments in the future of the company.

Again, a management team that leveraged up the company to the sacrifice of investments they need to make isn’t doing their job. I’m in the middle of a buyback for Nomad Foods today, a company which I’m a founder and Co-Chairman. It’s the largest frozen food company in Europe and we’re returning capital to investors for specific reasons, but not to the detriment of any acquisition opportunities, we have assessments that are going to be made in our own business, from a marketing support or anything else, for the future of the business.

There are times to do it. I think to say that buybacks should never be done is a big mistake. In fact, it surprises me sometimes with the politicians starting to talk about things like that. What people should do is make the right decisions for their companies. It’s not a question of whether it’s black and white, whether one thing is a good idea or a bad idea.

[00:10:46] Jonathan: To be clear, I think in certain instances buybacks are quite appropriate. For our asset management clients and for our research service, we do a lot of the John Malone companies and he’s a big believer in them and does a fairly good job of it. He was in the Outsider book as well, I believe. Are there any other executives that you think have done a good job with this?

[00:11:12] Martin: Yes, I think the Rales brothers who built Danaher, I think they would be a poster child example of good capital allocators and understanding how to build a business.

[00:11:21] Jonathan: Yes, and they’re doing it a second time, I believe with Colfax.

[00:11:25] Martin: That’s correct. We’re people who understand how to do these things, the skillset is transportable to any industry. Okay, not to toot my own horn, but I’ve had success in multiple different sectors, but I’m following the same playbook and the same disciplines because they are agnostic to what particular industry you’re in.

[00:11:46] Jonathan: Your first big success was actually in the optical business. It was in the early ’90s and you started rolling them up. You had all the areas you could have invested in. What attracted you to the eyes?

[00:12:00] Martin: I have to confess, I’d be lying if I told you it was because I did some huge industry analysis at the time, I was looking to do something when my father had retired and somebody came along and offered me 11 optical shops, and a company that looked to me when I looked at the numbers that it was going to go bankrupt. I saw an opportunity to buy a very small business, get an opportunity to get my foot in the door, and have hopefully the opportunity to buy the rest of it when into financial difficulty.

Like so many things, the old saying 80% of success is showing up. I put myself in an industry where I suddenly realized that my thesis was probably a poor one but I liked the business I was in. I’d called in all the suppliers to my stores and what I learned when I really sat down to talked to them is the people that made frames just made frames, the guys that made lenses, made lenses, the guys that made distributed contacts, and it was a very, pardon the pun, but a very myopic business.

People were focused on very narrow things. That gave me the idea of creating another integrated eyecare products company. The problem I had at the beginning was I was pretty poor so I didn’t have a lot of money and I had to figure out how to go from buying distressed businesses to buying healthier ones that will go in the platform and I didn’t know that at the time but that’s really what I was doing.

I went quite quickly, actually, from being a retailer to being a distributor or manufacturer of optical product. Each acquisition got progressively better in terms of quality of business. Until we’d built the largest lab system in the United States and Essilor, the largest lens maker in the world, figured we’d built a big enough infrastructure to offer a very generous price to buy it, which is when we sold it.

[00:13:53] Jonathan: You accomplished this in your late 20’s, early 30’s. Correct?

[00:13:57] Martin: Yes, I think I started when I was about 26, 27, and I sold it when I was about 30 or 31.

[00:14:06] Jonathan: Not bad for the early 30’s. It’s funny, growing up, my father started the business and one of his big earlier successes was a company called US Shoe, not because he liked the business, but they own lens crafters.

[00:14:20] Martin: I remember it well.

[00:14:22] Jonathan: Yes, he says it’s probably one of the worst run public companies ever.

[00:14:25] Martin: If I remember, that was also a company, the Rales brothers in their early days went after to try to buy.

[00:14:30] Jonathan: Yes, a lot of people did and they finally sold to Luxottica, took a lot of patience.

[00:14:39] Martin: Yes, I remember.

[00:14:41] Jonathan: As I mentioned earlier, you’re probably best known for Jarden, when you compounded it at over 30% per year for 15 years and you did it by basically forcing your way onto the board of a former of ball court spin out, which was a horribly run company. How did you manage to get yourself on the board?

[00:14:59] Martin: If I ever write a book, that’s going to be my favorite chapter because it’s a crazy story. The craziest story is how I became CEO, but I’ll tell it to you, I got on the board because I bought 9.9% of the company and they refused to really listen to any of my suggestions we looked to try to take it private. Then I made a public offer for the company. They rejected that.

Because it was an Indianapolis domicile company, it was very difficult to, if you like, force them to do anything but in the end, they decided to run a sale process. I was the only bidder. Then when they decided they didn’t want to sell to me, they’d rather make peace, they offered me two seats on the board and Ian Ashken, who’s been my longtime colleague and partner went on the board with me and that’s how I joined the board.

I went to my first board meeting in, I think, June of 2001. I’ve been buying shares from the beginning of 2000. Then the first meeting was an extraordinary meeting. I’d promised that I would be just a listener and observer in the first meeting. Ian went to a cricket match so he left me to the wolves on my own. I’ve sat in this meeting and one of the businesses they owned was called Triangle Plastics. It was a terrible acquisition that they had made and EBITDA was supposed to be $14 million. I had done due diligence on the company when we were looking at buying it. I knew for a fact that it was not probably going to be lucky to make two million of EBITDA, which means we’d have a big P&L loss.

The company was already in financial difficulty. This would have put them in covenant default. When I went to the first board meeting, the outside director, the lead director who had never met the president of this division, I told him, I thought it was a breach of their fiduciary duties they had never met the manager. It just so happened that my first meeting, that manager was there. He gives a presentation and he tells the board that he’s going to make 12 to 14 million of EBITDA that year. Now, remember this is June of this year. Already half the year is already done.

I already knew what the numbers were so everybody listened. I didn’t say a word and then they were going to move on to the next subject. Then I put my hand up. I said, “Look, I’m sorry, but I have to ask a question.” He said okay. Then I started asking questions. I said, “What’s your EBITDA year-to-date?” His answer was a billion dollars. I said, “Okay, what’s your expected EBITDA? Two billion dollars. What’s your expected EBITDA for this month?” He said, “I’m going to lose a million dollars.”

I said, “Okay. You’re telling the board, you’re going to make 12 to 14 million dollars. You’re going to do it in the back half, the slowest quarter in this industry because this is the fourth quarter. I know for a fact you have no chance of making these numbers. Why are you telling the board numbers you all know aren’t true? Who would ask you to tell you to stand up in front of this board and effectively lie to them?” He points with his finger to the CEO and he says, “He did.”

[laughter]

I know it’s a long story, but it’s worthy of telling. The CEO was going to be removed from that day forward and it took them 90 days to basically agree to give me the keys. It was one of those stories where the board did the right thing. I joined the board, the stock split adjusted was like $1.20 and we sold the company on an apples-to-apples basis of about $60. That’s really the job of the story.

[00:18:21] Jonathan: That’s an amazing story that a CEO would tell a subordinate basically to lie to a board.

[00:18:29] Martin: It was unbelievably– It was shocking and it played right into everything that I’ve been trying to explain to this board for a long time, which is that they had the wrong people running it and the underlying businesses were good businesses that had opportunity and we exploited that.

[00:18:46] Jonathan: You certainly did and primarily through an M&A strategy and you purchase brands like Coleman, Mr. Coffee, Playing Cards, Rawlings. What was your acquisition strategy?

[00:18:59] Martin: I will tell you that I don’t think our success was just M&A, I think M&A was a good piece of it. Our success was really because we ran the businesses well and we built a great culture and we really managed to attract the best talent in each of the businesses we were in to those businesses. Our criteria was very consistent across all of our acquisitions. We looked for market leaders in the respective consumer markets. I mean, obviously all consumers. We wanted businesses that were defendable, had defensible moats around them.

It’s really the same strategy I pursue today. We look for businesses that had good management teams and had generated a lot of free cash flow that we could buy for a reasonable multiple of those cash flows. That was the strategy. For the 25 or 26 acquisitions we made, there were probably 500 that nobody ever saw that we passed on, whether it be for price, culture, strategic battle, or whatever. We were very careful to make sure that the chemistry inside the company was never, if you like, tainted because I think one bad apple can ruin everything, so we were very cautious.

Did you take the Buffett handsoff approach with these businesses, or did you end up taking an active role?

[00:20:34] Martin: I think people who think that Buffett is inactive probably don’t get close enough to what he does. I think the reality is, we have a very similar view. You hire the very best people and then you give them the latitude to perform, and the incentives to perform. That we did, but what we did that I think was more important is, we gave them tools to be better than they would’ve ever been able to be on their own. For example, if we were doing shipping containers from Asia, all of our shipments were under the same umbrella agreement.

We could take a company who was doing a great job, and it saved them a significant amount of money just by them being under the tent. We did the same thing with insurance, with buying raw materials such as aluminum, and various resins, and all those kinds of things. Everything that was in the back of the house, we had the economies of scale, but we gave them the entrepreneurial freedom to build their businesses as they saw fit within the parameters of, if you like, budgets and forecasts that they would present to us on a forward basis.

[00:21:45] Jonathan: You’re a big believer in brands and that was a big part of your acquisition strategy. How did you figure if a brand was good enough to fit into your portfolio? Is it gut feeling, did you do consumer surveys, did you just simply look at cash flow and say, “Hey, if I can buy this at five times and it’s a decent enough brand, let’s put it in.” How did that work?

[00:22:06] Martin: The answer is, depends, okay. To give you some examples, I didn’t need to do a survey to know that United States’ Playing Card, that owned 94% of the playing club space in the United States had brand equity. That didn’t require a survey. When I bought Food Saver, which was the machine that made a oxygen barrier bag, I did a very full consulting study because it was a very narrow market and I wanted to understand was it a fad, or was it something that’s going to be around for a very long time?

By the way, we bought that business because everybody else thought it was a fad, and that business has produced every year substantial profits without, at least in the years I owned it, it went from 25 to over 45 million of EBITDA through the period without missing a beat. Our thesis was right, and we bought it very cheap because other people were very skeptical that it would have legs. We did the research, the consumer surveys, and everything else because we didn’t have that– It wasn’t obvious.

When it’s obvious, we don’t do work for the sake of doing work, we use our common sense. There are some things that were obvious, and some things that required more study, but when it required more study, we never cut corners though. I guess that was one of the things that I think we did well. We never had surprises after we bought things because we were thorough in our diligence.

[00:23:32] Jonathan: Would it be fair to say that one of the secrets to your success was making a lot less mistakes than everyone else?

[00:23:40] Martin: Yes, right. My dad said to me many years ago, he said, “You make more money on the deals you don’t do, than the deals you do.” That’s why I would be the first to tell you, I would be a great venture capitalist because I don’t think I could sleep at night knowing if I was doing 10 deals, two are home runs, they pay for everything else, and four of them go bust then the other ones are mediocre, I just couldn’t live with that because, for me, I’d be having sleepless nights about the four that were going bust, and what we’re going to do with the people? It’s just not my way of thinking. I have very little appetite for living with failures and moving on from them. This approach has always been better for me.

[00:24:21] Jonathan: How important were stores like Walmart to the success of Jarden. It seems like having good relationships with them was critical, I don’t know what percentage of sales of your products were at Walmart, but having such a concentrated–

[00:24:36] Martin: It started off as 5% and went to 15%. Amazon went from 1% and was probably 10% by the time we sold the business, and today would probably be 25%. What I always told people is, my job is to make our job, and the company’s job is to make great products, get them to wherever we want them to go on time in the most efficient way possible and to price them fairly, that’s our job.

I’m agnostic as to whether or not they’re sold in a retail store and an e-commerce platform or any other way. It’s not, to us, our job. I didn’t care if I was selling to Walmart or selling to a different kind of retailer, but our job was to make sure that we were the most efficient in doing it. They were important, but I think if it wasn’t Walmart, it had been somebody else because at the end of the day, they’re simply conduits to consumer purchasing. Our job was to make things that appeal to the consumers, and that would drive the demand.

I remember sitting with the president of Bed Bath & Beyond, who had asked me to give him help with his e-commerce strategy. What are you going to do to help me? I buy a lot of product from you, what are you going to do to help me with this? I had to explain to him, I said, “As much as I want to be helpful to you, that’s not my job. My job is to give you products that your consumers want to buy. How you figure out how you will deliver to your consumer is really your responsibility. I don’t know what to tell you.” Obviously, the ones that adapted to online strategies, and saw this coming where the successful companies.

I always reminded by management and this is the difference between Blockbuster and Netflix, was always staying sharp and adapting. That’s one of the things that Jarden did really well. We never got complacent. We never rested on our laurels. We always adapted. We tried to be the Netflix of our space, not the Blockbuster

[00:26:36] Jonathan: You had mentioned earlier that Amazon was becoming increasingly important as a few years ago, as a percentage of sales. A lot of your portfolio is branded consumables in today’s digital age where Amazon and Costco have such strong private label brands. Would it have been harder to have the success you had today?

[00:26:55] Martin: No. Private label is something that if you can’t compete with private label, you’re not doing your job because private label by definition doesn’t evolve because Walmart is not spending the same amount of time as a consumer-driven, consumer products producer to innovate. They’ll take somebody else’s product and they’ll figure out a way to make it either the same price or cheaper, but if you continue to innovate and value engineer your products, you should always be able to stay one step ahead of private label. I competed with private label all the time. One of the things, for example, at Coleman.

Coleman competed at Walmart. It was a very much a Walmart brand, but Ozark Trails was the house brand of Walmart. Walmart would be the first to admit that they needed Coleman to be successful, to drive revenue at Ozark Trails because people would come in to buy a tent. They’d see the Coleman product at one price point, and maybe they’d gone by the Ozark Trails product and the lower-price points. That was fine by Walmart because of how they sold their margins. If I wasn’t innovating and driving interest in the space, it wasn’t going to help them.

We always had an earned a place on the shelf because of the products that we produce, the innovations that we made, we drove traffic. Sometimes that’s the right strategy, and sometimes that’s the wrong one. One of the dividing lines for me with Newell after Jarden was sold to them. When they put Yankee Candle in Walmart. The flagship product, to me that unwound 50 years of goodwill and capital planning in one cynical move to try to boost revenue for the short-term, just because management wasn’t doing a good job. That’s how you kill a brand.

[00:28:45] Jonathan: That was a perfect lead into my next question. I know you’re no longer involved in Newell today. After spending so many years building up Jarden, clearly you follow the company and you’ve been very vocal that they cant M&A their way out of the problem. Do you currently think their problems are fixable?

[00:29:01] Martin: I have to be honest, I don’t know the new management team, and I don’t keep that close to tabs on it at this point because I’m a busy person. I don’t spend much time worrying about. I always tell my kids, “If you look over your shoulder, all you will get is a stiff neck?” I didn’t spend too much time worrying about what they’ve been doing in the last couple of years, but some of the things that were done were hard to unwind.

The Yankee Candle example is a good one in the sense that I just think that once you put your flagship product on the same shelf as something that used to sell it $39.99, and it’s now selling at $19.99 bogged down, and it’s sitting next to a product that looks very similar at $5.99, that’s hard to get over. They’ve got a lot of work to do. There are a lot of good brands in there still. Some of the best ones got sold.

All things could be better. That’s the sort of, I don’t know if they’ll be is as good as they were. I honestly don’t know. What I do know is that I had a very talented group of people on the Jarden side and most of them left and that’s never a good thing when you lose your talent, because at the end of the day businesses are just people.

[00:30:14] Jonathan: Absolutely and you said you always look forward and I guess currently to talk about what you’re doing now is you’ve been very involved in SPACs and you’re one of the most successful SPAC investors around. Briefly, do you mind explaining to the audience who might not know what a SPAC is and why yours is different?

[00:00:34] Martin: Sure. These are Special Purpose Acquisition Companies. I wish what I did wasn’t called a SPAC, but I started pretty early in this. I used it as a way to diversify my own investments. I partnered up with a guy called Nicholas Berggruen and we invested in three vehicles early on and what we decided to do that was different from anybody at the time was we put a lot of our own money to work in these things rather than just being promoters.

We did them on a scale that people like City Group would underwrite  them. We made them more institutional and what these vehicles do they’re very simply pools of cash that accumulated under one entity for the purposes of buying one company and taking it public and using that cash to, if you like, fund the equity offerings. Think of it like a pre-funded equity offering. The first iteration that I did, first three actually, were like the US model is today, which is you raised a bunch of money, you get 20% of the company for free, which is remarkable when you think about it.

Then you go and try and find a company and you have to have a shareholder vote and the investors have the right to either ask for their money back or vote in favor of the deal. If they vote in favor of the deal and they leave their money and you get the transaction done, and the sweetener for the investors is they get a package of warrants, usually a third of the company in warrants.

They have optionality on the upside. What I did when we bought Burger King, which was Justice, which is the fourth vehicle I raised, and now all the subsequent ones, we moved it offshore to the UK so we had a neutral tax jurisdiction. We raised it in the UK because the raising of the money cost half, as much as it costs in the US. Untold secrets about Europe versus the US, is it costs you between 5% and 7% gross spread to raise money in the US then it costs you between 1% and 2% to do exactly the same thing in exactly the same way but in the UK-

[00:02:43] Jonathan: Is there any reason for that?

[00:02:45] Martin: Yes, greedy bankers.

[laughter]

I don’t have a better answer for you. Probably litigation and all those other things, but the truth is the convention is a higher gross spread in America. That’s the truth. Then the second part of it is we don’t get any free shares. I’ve never wanted to make money unless my shareholders made money. We get a carry, we’re both similar to what a hedge fund that’s paid in shares on the upside but the quid pro quo is we give no vote to investors, it’s a board meeting.

These are true committed vehicles, they’re much more certain for the target companies that they’ll get a transaction completed. We are much more competitive with, let’s say, a private equity firm or a big corporate on the transaction and also we’re probably the most efficient way somebody can go public. There’s less frictional costs because there’s no upfront founder equity, and at the same time, we could deliver absolute certainty to the target. My view is, and it’s played out this way that you could do superior– If you want to buy quality companies, profitable companies that have long histories and are established and have choices as to what they’re going to do, this is a very viable, competitive structure.

US SPAC structure tends to do more speculative transactions because the non-speculative targets won’t deal with US SPACs. From my perspective, I think you can create better long-term outcomes because you buy better quality companies, that doesn’t mean that US SPAC can’t make shareholders money. All you have to do is look at a company like Nicola, which is almost a publicly listed venture investment that’s flying because there’s no PE to market against or revenue, by the way.

That’s not a knock on it. It could be one of the great companies of the future, but this is a publicly listed venture capital effort. That’s what that is and that’s not what I do. I do a very different thing, I buy very fundamental companies that make a lot of money today, made a lot of money for many, many years before and hopefully, will make even more money in the future. It’s a hunting license to do publicly-listed acquisitions without having a foundation company prior to that.

[00:35:06] Jonathan: As you mentioned, you had Justice Holdings which ended up taking Burger King public and it was obviously a fantastic success. Bloomberg reported in June, you’re thinking of starting another SPAC to invest in consumer business. Are you able to comment on that?

[00:35:22] Martin: Yes, I actually talked about it this morning on CNBC. I did disclose it. I’m going to create a vehicle called “Harvester” with Viking Global, the hedge fund. We’re putting up $200 million between us, then we’re going to raise probably about $750 million to a billion dollars in a new vehicle. It’ll be structured with very much the same as J2 which was the vehicle we used to buy API Group which is now symbols APG is now a public company that’s performing very well. The business is doing very well. We have very happy shareholders.

My goal, personally, is to have a portfolio have a portfolio of five large nine-figure investments in great companies whose capital allocation decisions I have a say in, not a dictatorship. It’s a collaborative process but I can influence those outcomes. If I really feel strongly that the wrong decision is being made in something, I have the power to stop it. From my perspective, that’s the way I’ve wanted to invest my capital for my family over the very long-term and I have no ambition to trade those investments. I don’t trade them in and out of them. This is truly long-term stuff.

[00:36:36] Jonathan: The new vehicle that you’re starting with Viking, is there a specific mandate you’re looking at or to certain type of companies?

[00:36:43] Martin: No. I have a carte blanche to go any jurisdiction, any type of business. The truth is, I will continue to do exactly what I’ve done for the last 25 years. I stick to the same formula because it’s worked in terms of the type of profile of company as we’ve talked about. I tend to hunt more in the consumer and industrial space as I think you will know but that doesn’t preclude looking at new things. I can tell you that Viking Global, one of the reasons for me to partner with them, apart from the fact that I just like to be from an intellectual standpoint, surrounded with intelligent people whose company I enjoy. I do it because I enjoy it at this point of my life.

I think they have a set of relationships and have made investments in sectors frankly I’ve never been in. If we find things that are in sectors that fit my criteria, in other words, these highly profitable businesses that have defensible moats, good management and history of cash flows, with those two places overlap, I may do something in a totally different space from where I’ve been before which is exciting to me.

[00:37:49] Jonathan: Martin, you’ve been extremely generous with your time. I want to thank you for being on the World According to Boyar Podcast. I enjoyed learning about your fascinating career and I’m excited to hear about your latest venture. I’m sure it’ll be as big of a success as the Justice Holdings one was.

[00:38:07] Martin: Thank you.

[00:38:07] Jonathan: To be sure, you never miss another World According to Boyar episode, please follow us on Twitter @BoyarValue.

 

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Jonathan Boyar Discusses The Investment Case For Disney, Twitter, Madison Square Garden Sports/ Entertainment and Berkshire Hathaway

In a recent interview with Value Investing Digest, Jonathan Boyar discussed a few stocks that look attractive from a long-term perspective, including:

  • Twitter
  • The Walt Disney Company
  • Madison Square Garden Entertainment
  • Madison Square Garden Sports
  • Berkshire Hathaway.

Other topics discussed were the firm’s valuation methodology and Boyar Asset Management’s recent partnership with Mapfre, the Spanish based international insurance company.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This information is not a recommendation, or an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, an interest in any security, including an interest in any investment vehicle managed or advised by Boyar Asset Management (“Boyar”) or its affiliates. Past performance does not guarantee future results. This material is as of the date indicated, is not complete, and is subject to change without notice.  Additional information is available upon request.  No representation is made with respect to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of information and Boyar assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. Nothing in this video should be construed as investment advice of any kind. Consult your financial adviser before making any investment decisions. Any opinions expressed herein represent current opinions only and no representation is made with respect to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of information, and Boyar Asset Management and its affiliates assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. You should not assume that any investment discussed herein will be profitable or that any investment decisions in the future will be profitable.   Past performance does not guarantee future results. Certain information has been provided by and/or is based on third party sources and, although believed to be reliable, has not been independently verified and Boyar Asset Management or any of its affiliates is not responsible for third-party errors.  This information is not a recommendation, or an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, an interest in any security, including an interest in any investment vehicle managed or advised by affiliates of Boyar Research.  Any information that may be considered advice concerning a federal tax issue is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for the purposes of (i) avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter discussed herein. Boyar Asset Management, its employees or affiliates may own shares in any of the companies referenced in this email.

Any results mentioned, do not necessarily represent the results of any of the accounts managed by Boyar Asset Management Inc., and the results of Boyar Asset Management Inc. accounts could and do differ materially from any of the results presented. While the results presented show profits, there was the real possibility of a permanent loss of capital. This information is for illustration and discussion purposes only and is not intended to be relied upon as a forecast, research or investment advice, and is not a recommendation, offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities or to adopt any investment strategy. Boyar Asset Management Inc. is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration of an Investment Advisor does not imply any level of skill or training. A copy of current Form ADV Part 2A is available upon request or at www.advisorinfo.sec.gov. Please contact Boyar Asset Management Inc. at (212) 995-8300 with any questions.  Clients of Boyar Asset Management owns shares in Disney, Madison Square Garden Sports, Madison Square Garden Entertainment, Twitter, & Berkshire Hathaway. 

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The Boyar Value Group’s Case for Investing in Sports Teams

Jonathan Boyar was a guest on the Contrarian Investor podcast where he discussed the merits of investing in the public equity of certain professional sports teams.

Other topics included:

  • The Boyar Value Group’s investing style and examples of stocks we currently find attractive
  • Why the continued legalization of online sports gambling should make teams more valuable
  • Boyar’s view on portfolio construction
  • And much more…

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*This information is not a recommendation, or an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, an interest in any security, including an interest in any investment vehicle managed or advised by Boyar Asset Management (“Boyar”) or its affiliates. Past performance does not guarantee future results. This material is as of the date indicated, is not complete, and is subject to change.  Additional information is available upon request.  No representation is made with respect to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of information and Boyar assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. Nothing in this interview should be construed as investment advice of any kind. Consult your financial adviser before making any investment decisions. Any opinions expressed herein represent current opinions only and no representation is made with respect to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of information, and Boyar Asset Management and its affiliates assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. You should not assume that any investment discussed herein will be profitable or that any investment decisions in the future will be profitable.   Past performance does not guarantee future results. Certain information has been provided by and/or is based on third party sources and, although believed to be reliable, has not been independently verified and Boyar Asset Management or any of its affiliates is not responsible for third-party errors.  This information is not a recommendation, or an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, an interest in any security, including an interest in any investment vehicle managed or advised by affiliates of Boyar Research.  Any information that may be considered advice concerning a federal tax issue is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for the purposes of (i) avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter discussed herein. Boyar Asset Management, its employees or affiliates may own shares in any of the companies referenced in this email.

Any results mentioned, do not necessarily represent the results of any of the accounts managed by Boyar Asset Management Inc., and the results of Boyar Asset Management Inc. accounts could and do differ materially from any of the results presented. While the results presented show profits, there was the real possibility of a permanent loss of capital. This information is for illustration and discussion purposes only and is not intended to be relied upon as a forecast, research or investment advice, and is not a recommendation, offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities or to adopt any investment strategy. Boyar Asset Management Inc. is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration of an Investment Advisor does not imply any level of skill or training. A copy of current Form ADV Part 2A is available upon request or at www.advisorinfo.sec.gov. Please contact Boyar Asset Management Inc. at (212) 995-8300 with any questions.

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You Can’t Be Too Focused On The Macroeconomic Headlines

Jonathan Boyar speaks in a new Yahoo Finance interview about the macroeconomic headlines. His view is that one needs to look at business fundamentals instead and be PATIENT because you can’t time this market.

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Jonathan Boyar Interview On Zona Value

Jonathan Boyar was recently a guest on the Zona Value Club where he discusses:

  • The history of the Boyar Value Group
  • Our investment philosophy
  • How we uncover what we believe to be intrinsically undervalued stocks and much more…

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*This information is not a recommendation, or an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, an interest in any security, including an interest in any investment vehicle managed or advised by Boyar Asset Management (“Boyar”) or its affiliates. Past performance does not guarantee future results. This material is as of the date indicated, is not complete, and is subject to change.  Additional information is available upon request.  No representation is made with respect to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of information and Boyar assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. Nothing in this interview should be construed as investment advice of any kind. Consult your financial adviser before making any investment decisions. Any opinions expressed herein represent current opinions only and no representation is made with respect to the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of information, and Boyar Asset Management and its affiliates assumes no obligation to update or revise such information. You should not assume that any investment discussed herein will be profitable or that any investment decisions in the future will be profitable.   Past performance does not guarantee future results. Any information that may be considered advice concerning a federal tax issue is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, for the purposes of (i) avoiding penalties imposed under the United States Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter discussed herein. Boyar Asset Management, its employees or affiliates may own shares in any of the companies referenced in this email. This information is for illustration and discussion purposes only and is not intended to be relied upon as a forecast, research or investment advice, and is not a recommendation, offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities or to adopt any investment strategy. Boyar Asset Management Inc. is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration of an Investment Advisor does not imply any level of skill or training. A copy of current Form ADV Part 2A is available upon request or at www.advisorinfo.sec.gov. Please contact Boyar Asset Management Inc. at (212) 995-8300 with any questions.

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